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Abstract
The extent to which the money supply affects the aggregate cash balance demanded
at a certain level of nominal income and interest rates is determined by the interest-
rate-elasticity and stability of the money demand. An actuarial approach is adopted
in this paper for dealing with investors facing liquidity constraints and maintaining
different expectations about risks. Under such circumstances, a level of surplus exists
which maximises expected value. Moreover, when the distorted probability principle
is introduced, the optimal liquidity demand is expressed as a Value at Risk and the
comonotonic dependence structure determines the amount of money demanded by the
economy. As a consequence, the more unstable the economy, the greater the interest-
rate-elasticity of the money demand. Moreover, for different parametric characteri-
sation of risks, market parameters are expressed as the weighted average of sectorial
or individual estimations, in such a way that multiple equilibria of the economy are
possible.
Key words: Money demand; Monetary policy; Economic capital; Distorted risk
principle; Value-at-Risk.
JEL-Classification: E41, E44, E52, G11.
1 Introduction
According to the Keynes’s liquidity preference proposition (Keynes, 1935), the demand for
cash balances is positively affected by the level of income and negatively affected by the return
offered by a class of money substitutes. The first part of the proposition is a consequence of
the assumption that the amount of transactions is proportional to the level of income. To
explain the effect of the interest rate, Keynes emphasises the influence of capital fluctuations
in decision-making. Thus, investors expecting interest rates to rise demand fewer risk-free
securities in order to avoid capital losses — since the price of such instruments is expected to
diminish in this case. By contrast, when interest rates are expected to fall, more bonds are
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demanded — in this way, capital gains can be attained after the collapse of interest rates.
Therefore, fewer provisions are maintained for high levels of the interest rate and vice versa.
In macroeconomic analysis, the level of prices establishes the connection between nominal
magnitudes, expressed in monetary units, and real quantities, which represent flows of goods
and services. Accordingly, Y = P ·y, where P , Y and y respectively denote the level of prices,
the nominal income and the real income. Let us additionally denote by M the total money
supply. Therefore, the short-run monetary equilibrium is given by the quantity equation:
M = P y · l(r) = Y · l(r) (1)
The liquidity preference function l(r) expresses the ratio between demanded cash balances
and nominal income. It is not likely to be constant but it may change slowly over time. The
inverse ratio of the liquidity preference function is called velocity of money.
Any change in the money supply will require a change in one or more of the variables
determining the liquidity demand (i.e. P , y or r) in order to reestablish the monetary
equilibrium. When prices are rigid for short-run fluctuations and the real product remain
stable in short-terms, the whole adjustment is performed in l(r). In addition, if liquidity
preference is absolute, i.e. if investors are satisfied at a single level of the interest rate,1 the
amount of money can change without a change in either nominal income or interest rates.
Under such circumstances, monetary policy is useless for dealing with short-run fluctuations.
The situation is different if prices are flexible and liquidity preference is non-absolute. Then
a monetary expansion produces a new equilibrium involving a higher price for the same
quantity, the higher this response the more inelastic the money demand. In the short-run,
production is encouraged until prices are reestablished at their original level. In the long-run,
new producers enter the market and existing plants are expanded (Friedman, 1970).
Under such circumstances, the efficacy of monetary policy depends on the degree of rigid-
ity of prices and the elasticity of the money demand, as well as on the stability of liquidity
preference. There is a consensus among researchers about the existence of a stable long-
run relationship, though fluctuations of cash balances in the short-run remain unexplained.
Episodes like the missing money in the mid-seventies, the great velocity decline in the early
eighties, followed by the expansion of narrow money in the mid-eighties, or the velocity puz-
zle of the mid-nineties, still lack a satisfactory explanation (Ball, 2001 and 2002; Carpenter
and Lange, 2002; Teles and Zhou, 2005). In accounting for such drawbacks, recent literature
has focussed on uncertainty, which is supposed to have been incremented after 1980 due to
deregulation and financial innovations (Atta-Mensah, 2004; Baum et al., 2005; Carpenter
and Lange, 2002; Choi and Oh, 2003; Greiber and Lemke, 2005). Deregulation and finan-
cial innovation are also given as arguments to support the role of the opportunity cost in
accounting for unexplained fluctuations (Ball, 2002; Collins and Edwards, 1994; Duca, 2000;
Dreger and Wolters, 2006; Teles and Zhou, 2005). According to this view, a stable long-run
relationship exits and movements of the interest rate can explain all short-run episodes, as
long as the right monetary aggregate is used (Ball, 2002).
1Absolute liquidity preference corresponds to the case when the liquidity demand is perfectly elastic with
respect to the interest rate. According to Keynes, the degree of elasticity depends on how homogeneous
expectations are, where perfect elasticity is obtained when expected and actual values are the same. In this
case, money and risk-free securities are perfect substitutes — since no capital gains or losses are expected.
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In this paper, an extended model is proposed according to which liquidity preference is
explicitly determined by uncertainty and information. First, the cash demand of a single
representative investor is obtained. Investors are supposed to face liquidity constraints and
consequently, in Section 2 equity is treated as an additional liability. In addition, the be-
haviour towards risk is determined by the transformation of probabilities according to an
informational parameter. Then the expected return of the fund is maximised when the math-
ematical expectation of the residual exposure (a measure of the cost of assuming bankruptcy)
plus the opportunity cost of capital is minimised. In this way, I follow Dhaene et al. (2003),
who on these terms develop a mechanism for capital allocation (see also Goovaerts et al.,
2005). When looking for the aggregated surplus in Section 3, capital is supposed to be pro-
vided by a central authority or financial intermediaries acting in a competitive market, in
such a way that a single interest rate is required for lending. Hence the situation is similar
to the case of a centralised conglomerate distributing capital among subsidiaries (Dhaene et
al., 2003; Goovaerts et al., 2005; Mierzejewski, 2006) and the opportunity cost of money is
related to the average return over a class of money substitutes. Thus, monetary aggregates
are determinants of liquidity preference in the model. Finally, within a Gaussian setting,
the aggregate exposure is normally distributed and its volatility is equal to the weighted
average of individual volatilities. Therefore, aggregation plays a role in the determination
and stability of the liquidity demand. The same results are obtained when marginal risks
are Exponentially and Pareto distributed. The final remarks are given in Section 4.
2 The Rational Money Demand
Since in frictionless markets the amount of cash maintained for precautionary purposes can
be modified at any time by lending and borrowing, managers who maximise value demand
no equity — which is actually the proposition established by Modigliani and Miller (1958).
However, averse-to-risk customers are sensible to fluctuations and, as long as the business
activities of financial intermediaries — which accordingly are said to be opaque — are not
observed by outsiders, a pressure is established to be perceived as default-free (Merton, 1997).
In the model developed by Tobin (1958), averse-to-risk investors show liquidity preference as
behaviour towards uncertainty. Assuming that risks follow Gaussian distributions, a linear
relationship is established between the expected returns and volatilities of the portfolios
containing a proportion of a certain fund and a cash guarantee, which determines the set
of efficient portfolios — in the sense that for any combination outside the line, it is always
possible to build a new fund providing the same expected return and a lower risk, or the same
risk but a higher return. The way preferences affect portfolio decisions can then be analysed
in the plane of expected returns and volatilities, where the indifference curves of risk-lovers
should present a negative slope, as long as such individuals accept a lower expected return
if there is a chance to obtain additional gains. By contrast, averse-to-risk investors do not
take more risk unless they are compensated by a greater expected return and consequently,
their indifference curves have positive slopes. Therefore, for any risk-aversion profile, the
optimal combination is determined by the (tangency point of) intersection between the
unique indifference curve representing preferences and the line of efficient portfolios.
Let us analyse in the following how the Tobin’s model is affected by the hypothesis of im-
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perfect competition, a case where risks belong to a general class of probability distributions
which economic agents distort according to their information and knowledge when making
decisions. Moreover, liquidity constraints are faced when borrowing and lending and man-
agers have to expend effort to correctly asses prices. Let the parameter θ denote the state of
information of an investor holding a mutual fund whose percentage return is represented by
the random variable X. Because of the precautionary motive, a guarantee L is maintained
for a determined period of time to avoid bankruptcy. In order to introduce in the model the
effect of liquidity constraints, equity is regarded as an additional liability and the size of the
guarantee is expressed as a proportion of the level of income Y , such that L = Y · l, where l
represents the proportion of income assigned to the non-risky asset. Hence, if r0 denotes the
risk-free interest rate, the percentage capital return of the total portfolio can be expressed
as Y = X − l − r0 · l and decisions are affected by the percentage return on income:
µθ,Y = Eθ[Y ] = (µθ,X − l)− r0 · l
In giving a meaning to the informational parameter θ, let us stress the fact that expec-
tations are wanted to be modified. Then probability beliefs are transformed by a distortion
parameter which is supposed to be determined by information and knowledge and the pro-










The cumulative and decumulative (also known as survival) probability distribution functions
have been introduced, Fθ,X(x) = Pθ [X ≤ x] = 1− Pθ [X > x] = 1− Gθ,X(x). When θ > 1,
the expected value of risk is overestimated and underestimated when θ < 1, in this way
respectively accounting for the behaviour of averse-to-risk and risk-lover investors.
Notice, however, that individuals react differently depending on the sign of the capital
return. In fact, when a loss is suffered, cash is demanded to avoid default, while in the
case a gain is obtained the surplus can be used to pay current liabilities or assigned to
new investments. Hence, decision-makers mainly concerned about the speculative and the









Let us accordingly assume that capital decisions are taken by risk managers who minimise




] ≈ Eθ [X+]− rθ,X · l
Since the term rθ,X > 0 represents the absolute value of the marginal reduction in insured
capital gains produced when attracting an additional unit of equity, it can be regarded as a
premium for solvency. Hence the following expression is obtained for the expected percentage
income:
µθ,Y = Eθ [X+]− Eθ
[
(X + l)−
]− (r0 + rθ,X) · l
Under such conditions, precautionary investors that maximise value minimise bankruptcy
costs. Applying Lagrange optimisation, we obtain that decision makers attract funds until







]− (r0 + rθ,X) = Gθ,−X (l∗)− (r0 + rθ,X) = 0
Equivalently, it can be said that investors stop demanding money at the level at which
the marginal expected gain in solvency equals its opportunity cost. Thus the optimal cash
demand is given by:
lθ,X (r0 + rθ,X) = G
−1
θ,−X (r0 + rθ,X) (2)
From this expression, the money demand follows a decreasing and — as long as the dis-
tribution function describing uncertainty is continuous — continuous path, whatever the
kind of risks and distortions. The minimum and maximum levels of surplus are respectively
demanded when (r0 + rθ,X) ≥ 1 and (r0 + rθ,X) ≤ 0.
In practical applications, intermediaries face operational and administrative costs, at
the time that a premium over the risk-free interest rate is asked for lending in secondary
markets. Hence, the return r0 + rθ,X can be interpreted as a net opportunity cost. Though
environmental facts, such as the perception of credit quality and gains in efficiency because
of improvements on analysis and administration, are expected to evolute on time, we can
regard them as softly modified — and not a matter of speculation. Also the risk attitude
of managers is supposed to remain more or less unchanged. Therefore, the parameter θ is
expected to remain stable and consequently, as long as the probability distribution of the
random variable X is also stable, the capital decisions of investors should remain more or
less the same and the economy as a whole should behave accordingly.
However, if probability distributions are allowed to evolve on time — i.e. if the pro-
cesses of capital gains and losses are not stationary — so does the premium for solvency
rθ,X . Actually, this can be the case after a monetary expansion — which can be performed
by the central bank as well as by the entrance of new investors — since as long as part of
the extra money is used to buy financial securities and the increment in demand is high





pushed to increase. In a similar way, a monetary contraction can press the insured return
to decrease. This situation might in turn impel decision-makers to actualise expectations
and so the informational parameter θ might be modified. But this adjustment is supposed
to be produced with a certain delay — for time is required for analysis — while the op-
portunity cost may be instantaneously altered. Therefore, changes in the stock of money
may induce instability from within in secondary markets. Adjustments are performed along
a stable money demand relationship, though the process may be reinforced by structural
modifications once expectations are actualised.
3 Short-Run Monetary Equilibrium
In order to obtain an expression for the cash balance demanded by the whole economy,
let us assume that economic agents hold aggregate exposures characterised by the random
variables X1, · · · , Xn. Capital is supplied by a central authority at a single interest rate r
(or, equivalently, secondary markets are regarded as competitive and financial intermediaries
are price takers) relying on the informational parameter θ and the uncertainty introduced
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by the market portfolio X. When differing expectations are allowed among decision makers,







The second equality is a mathematical identity as long as the process of capital gains and
losses of the market portfolio is described by the comonotonic sum X = Xc1 + · · · + Xcn,






denotes the distribution function of the comono-
tonic sum when marginal distributions are given by (Gθ1,−X1 , . . . , Gθn,−Xn). Comonotonicity
characterises an extreme case of dependence, when no benefit can be obtained from diver-
sification.2 Thus precautionary investors rely on the most pessimistic case, when the failure
in any single firm spreads all over the market.
The dependence of the liquidity demand on the variability of income becomes explicit in
a Gaussian setting. Let us assume in the following that individual exposures are distributed
as Gaussians with means µ1, . . . , µn and volatilities σ1, . . . , σn, while the contributions of
individual exposures to the market portfolio are given by the coefficients λ1, . . . , λn, with
0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 ∀i, such that Y i = λi · Y and Y = Y 1 + · · · + Y n. Volatilities are expressed as
proportions of the levels of income and can be interpreted as the volatilities of different funds
as well as the distorted volatilities of the same Gaussian exposure — or some intermediate
case. Under such conditions, the comonotonic sum is also a Gaussian random variable whose




λi · µi & σ =
n∑
i=1
λi · σi (3)
On these grounds, the weighted average mean and volatility describe the uncertainty of
the market portfolio. In particular, high volatility may be induced by a single group, as a
negative externality to more efficient companies and so the possibility of contagion naturally
arises in the model. In the same way, stability may be inherited by less efficient institutions
when low volatility predominates.
Since the quantile function of a Gaussian random variable can be express in terms of the
standard Normal distribution Φ (Dhaene et al., 2002), the short-run monetary equilibrium
is described by the following equation:
M = Y · lµ,σ(r) = Y ·
[ − (µ+ σ Φ−1 (r)) ] (4)
Therefore, the monetary equilibrium can be reestablished by modifying the level of nominal
income Y , the average return µ, the market volatility σ or the interest rate r. As already
stated, only r is expected to change in the short-run. Monitoring and analysis induce in-
vestors to eventually incorporate the new regime ofX in decision making and possibly modify
expectations, both determinants of µ and σ.
The difference between the classic and the extended model can be noticed by comparing
Equations 1 and 4. Thus, while in Equation 1 the elasticity of income with respect to the
2The inverse probability distribution of the comonotonic sum is given by the sum of the inverse marginal
distributions (Dhaene et al., 2002).
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stock of money exclusively depends on the interest rate through the liquidity preference
function, in Equation 4 it is also affected by uncertainty. In addition, if y represents the level
of real income, the new short-run equilibrium can be written in real terms as:
M = P y · [ − (µ+ σ Φ−1 (r)) ]
Therefore, to stabilise the product it is also required to control the market risk. A proper
monetary policy should then consider a combination of P , µ, σ and r compatible with a
given level of income. The level of σ that preserves the monetary equilibrium for given
values of M , Y , µ and r can be regarded as the induced volatility. A tentative criterion for
monetary policy may then involve the determination of the level of interest rates ensuring a
given inflation and induced market volatility. Additionally, the non-distorted volatility can
be estimated by the standard deviation of the random variable X representing the capital
losses of the market portfolio. A measure of the degree of distortion performed by the market
is thus determined by the difference between the induce and the non-distorted volatility.
An alternative representation is obtained by considering that individual exposures are
exponentially distributed. In this case, the comonotonic sum is also exponentially distributed
(see Dhaene et al., 2002), such that if β1, . . . , βn denote the informational types of investors,
with βi ≥ 0 ∀i, and, as before, λ1, . . . , λn represent the marginal contributions to the aggre-
gate income, with 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 ∀i, then the exponential parameter of the market portfolio is





Therefore, the liquidity preference function of the economy is given by:
lβ(r) = −β · ln(r) , with β > 0 (5)
Thus, the higher the parameter β, which within this framework completely characterises
risk, the more sensitive is liquidity preference to the cost of capital. In this way, uncertainty
is explicitly related to the monetary equilibrium and hence to the terms of liquidity —
determined by the money supply.
When marginal risks are Pareto distributed, the survival probability distributions as es-
timated by decision-makers are given by:
G−Xi(x) = x
− 1
αi , with αi > 0 and x > 1
The parameters α1, . . . , αn correspond to the states of information of investors. As long as
they agree on a single value α, the comonotonic sum is also Pareto distributed (Dhaene et
al., 2002) and liquidity preference is given by:
lα(r) = n · r−α (6)
Under differing expectations, the comonotonic sum is not necessarily Pareto distributed.
However, an estimation of the parameter α can be found such that Equation 6 determines
the monetary equilibrium. In this case, the point interest-rate-elasticity is constant and
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equal to α. Many models for the estimation of the money demand are supported on this
assumption.
4 Conclusions
An extended model is presented in this paper — also referred to as the imperfect competition
model — to characterise the liquidity preference of investors facing liquidity constraints. Un-
der such circumstances, a level of surplus exists that maximises value and the rational money
demand is determined by the quantile function — a measure of the probability accumulated
in the tail of the distribution function — of the random variable representing the series of
capital profits and losses of the residual exposure (Equation 2). In this way, an equivalence
is established between a confidence level and the opportunity cost of capital and the optimal
amount of cash is determined by the exchange of a sure return and a flow of probability.
An informational parameter, affecting the opportunity cost of money, represents the expec-
tations of decision makers. Averse-to-risk and risk-lover investors respectively under and
overestimate the cost of capital and so they respectively demand more and less equity.
The importance attached to liquidity preference in macroeconomic analysis is a conse-
quence of the fact that it determines the short-run monetary equilibrium of the economy. In
the classic approach (Friedman, 1970), the amount of money which is compatible with given
levels of nominal income and interest rates can be obtained from Equation 1. According to
the extended model presented in this paper, the aggregate money demand of the economy
is given by the sum of the liquidity preferences of investors, mathematically characterised
by the comonotonic sum of individual exposures. The aggregate money demand is thus
expressed as a Value-at-Risk but referred to a market portfolio which relies on the most
pessimistic case, when no gain can be obtained from diversification. In a Gaussian setting,
the comonotonic sum is also a Gaussian variable, whose volatility is equal to the weighted
average of individual volatilities (Equation 4). In this way, the classic model is extended
allowing a correction for risk.
Within the imperfect competition framework, the total stock of money M , the level of
income Y , the interest rate r, the mean µ and the market volatility σ are all determinants of
the short-run monetary equilibrium (Equation 4). Thus, as long as part of the funds available
in the economy are spent on capital assets, an adjustment in the opportunity cost r is
expected in the short-run — stimulated by the modification of the stochastic nature of capital
gains — which is supposed to instantaneously affect liquidity preference. In the medium-
term, investors correct their expectations and so part of the adjustment may be performed
through informational shocks affecting the aggregate mean or the market volatility. An
important feature of the mechanism is that the evolution of risks, motivated by flows of
funds, determine expectations and not the opposite, though liquidity preference might also
be affected by a purely informational shock.
As pointed out in Section 2, liquidity preference is not affected in the same way by
capital gains and losses. Thus, while positive returns affect the opportunity cost of money
and so determine a movement along a stable relationship, the precautionary attitude of
decision makers depends on negative returns, as does the shape of the money demand (see
Equation 2). The first adjustment is supposed to occur instantaneously, while the second one
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is performed gradually, for it takes time for investors to internalise new market conditions.
In practice, both decisions are related to different markets. Accordingly, the cost of equity
r is represented by the average return over a class of securities, other than cash, that can
be regarded as substitutes to money. On the other hand, the liquidity preference function
depends on the series of returns over a set of instruments representative of assumed exposures.
Then the variability showed by a representative index of this class determines the market
volatility σ.
Finally, as stated in Equation 3, in a Gaussian setting the expected value of the mar-
ket portfolio and the market variability are respectively given by the weighted average of
individual means and volatilities. Hence, the market uncertainty will be mainly determined
by a single institution or sector, in the case it contributes more to the aggregate exposure.
Stability can be induced in the whole market in this way. The same results are obtained
when individual exposures are exponentially or Pareto distributed, for in both cases the risk
parameters are aggregated when accounting for market behaviour. Moreover, the model
accepts multiple equilibria, since different combinations of the risk parameters may lead to
the same market characterisation.
The terms under which market shocks affect individual expectations about risks will be
determined by specific conditions, such as the state of aggregation, restrictions in the access
to credit, the distribution of information within the market and the skills and knowledge
of investors. Thus, changes in the aggregate monetary stock may induce intermediaries to
prefer bigger or more efficient companies — flight to quality — a situation that may become
more difficult the availability of funds and possibly increment more the riskiness of less
productive sectors of the economy. In this way, within the imperfect competition framework,
a broader meaning is attached to instability.
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